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1. INTRODUCTION
On September 28, 1993, the Institute for International
Economics released a study evaluating domestic disincentives
to U.S. trade.' According to that study, then-current domestic
restrictions on U.S. trade cost the nation between $25 billion
and $40 billion each year.2 The Institute's study directly
attributed two-thirds to three-fourths of the estimated export
"shortfall" to domestic export controls.3 Just prior to this
study's release, U.S. Export-Import Bank Chairman Kenneth
D. Brody noted that the United States lost $10 to $15 billion
annually due to unnecessary export controls.4 Although
Brody's figures are lower than the Institute's, both estimates
reveal that U.S. businesses are suffering substantial losses.
The export shortfall becomes even more significant when one
considers that each $1 billion in exports supports
approximately 19,100 U.S. jobs.5
Domestic controls on exports of high-technology equipment
particularly have been restrictive. Prior to September 1993,
computers, telecommunications equipment, and electronics
accounted for eighty percent of export control license
* J.D. Candidate, 1995, University of Pennsylvania Law School;
A.M.R.S., 1992, University of Chicago; B.S., 1989, Messiah College.
1 See U.S. Export Controls, Other 'Disincentives' Cost Firms $40 Billion
a Year, Study Says, 10 Intl Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 38, 1608, 1608 (Sept. 29,
1993).
21d
' The study attributes the remainder of the shortfall to insufficient
export financing, foreign policy trade sanctions, and costs resulting from
product-liability regulations in certain important trade sectors. Id.
4 See Eximbank Will Be 'More Aggressive' in Using Tied-Aid War Chest,
Brody Says, 10 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 38, 1608, 1608 (Sept. 29, 1993)
(quoting statements made by Chairman Brody on September 23, 1993).
' See U.S. Exports To Mexico Grew Sharply Between 1987 and 1992, Data
Show, 10 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 38, 1616, 1616 (Sept. 29, 1993).
Whether this correlation would continue to hold if higher export levels were
actually attained is speculative.
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applications.' Strict control of high-technology exports has
become quite burdensome in light of the recent emergence of
vast new markets for this type of technology." For example,
Robert E. Allen, Chairman of American Telephone &
Telegraph Co. ("AT&T"), testifying before the House Foreign
Affairs Subcommittee on Economic Policy, Trade, and
Environment, estimated that then-current restrictions on high-
technology exports, if continued, would jeopardize
approximately $500 million in potential AT&T sales over the
next five years to countries such as Russia and the People's
Republic of China.' With the end of the Cold War, the fall of
communism in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union,
and the resulting new world economy, such severely restrictive
controls on high-technology exports have become outdated.
On September 29, 1993, the Clinton administration
unveiled a long-term export promotion plan.' Ronald H.
Brown, Secretary of the Department of Commerce, in his
capacity as Chairman of the nineteen-agency Trade Promotion
Coordinating Committee ("TPCC"), supervised the drafting of
the plan. He has referred to it as the embodiment of a "sea
change" in U.S. export promotion and policy.'0 Indeed, if
government estimates are correct, the actual and proposed
changes in the plan would remove export license requirements
from over $30 billion worth of computers and high-technology
equipment." Additionally, these changes could raise overall
U.S. exports from the current annual total of approximately
$700 billion to a total of $1 trillion annually by the end of the
6 See Special Report: Clinton Unveils TPCC Export Plan Addressing
Controls and Financing, 10 Intl Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 38, 1645, 1645 (Sept.
29, 1993) [hereinafter TPCC Plan]. This statistic indicates the extent to
which high-technology goods have been subject to export control. The export
licenses required in this area were necessary due either to the nature of the
goods or technology involved, or to the export status of the country to which
the goods were to be shipped. See id. at 1658 (reproducing excerpts from
the Clinton administration's report Toward a National Export Strategy).
7 See Eagleburger Says Allied Pressure Will Force End To COCOM
Relatively Soon, 10 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 38, 1609, 1609 (Sept. 29,
1993).
s See id. at 1610.
8 See TPCC Plan, supra note 6, at 1645.
'0 See id. at 1645.
" See id. at 1646.
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century.12
This Comment analyzes U.S. export regulations both
generally and specifically with regard to computers and high-
technology equipment specifically. This Comment then
reviews the Clinton administration's proposed export
promotion plan and concludes that, with some slight
modifications, the plan will achieve its objective of increasing
U.S. exports of computers and high-technology equipment.
Section 2 of this Comment reviews the nature of the federal
government's control of U.S. exports and outlines the complex
export regulation system of the Department of Commerce.
Section 3 analyzes the detrimental effects of overly-restrictive
U.S. export controls. Section 4 discusses the Clinton
administration's proposed export promotion plan, with specific
reference to its effect on exports of computers and high-
technology equipment.13
12 See id. at 1645. Such an increase in overall exports could mean the
creation of approximately six million new U.S. jobs. See Why Fear Free
Trade? Let's Just Sell Our Wares, USA TODAY, Sept. 28, 1993, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Usatdy File.
Recently, Secretary Brown appeared before the House Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee on Economic Policy, Trade, and Environment to present the
Second Annual Report of the TPCC. In his prepared statement, the
Secretary emphasized the growth in U.S. sales abroad over the past year
and made reference to expanding economic growth in the industrialized
nations, the beneficial effects of the North American Free Trade Agreement,
and increased exports to East Asia and South America before concluding
that the United States "can look forward to a stronger export performance
for 1995 and beyond .... .Prepared Statement By Ronald Brown, Secretary
Of Commerce, Before The Senate Committee On Banking, Fed. News Service,
Oct. 5, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Fednew File [hereinafter
Prepared Statement by Ronald Brown]. The Secretary then stated his belief
that the Clinton administration "can raise [its] objective from $1 trillion in
U.S. exports by the year 2000 to an even more ambitious objective of $1.2
trillion in U.S. exports by the year 2000." Id. (citation omitted). At roughly
20,000 jobs for each $1 billion in exports, such an increase from the current
export level would translate into 10 million new U.S. jobs.
13 See TPCC Plan, supra note 6, at 1645-46.
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2. FEDERAL REGULATION OF U.S. EXPORTS
2.1. The Broad Federal Control of Exports
Congress exercises its power to regulate commerce in part
through comprehensive control of U.S. exports. 4 The United
States subjects all commodities and technology exported from
the country to some degree of government regulation. 5 As a
result of its plenary authority to regulate trade, Congress has
authorized government entities such as the Department of
State,1" the Department of Energy,'" and the Drug
Enforcement Administration 8 to monitor and regulate the
flow of certain goods and technology from the United States.
The aforementioned agencies, however, oversee only a small
percentage of total U.S. exports, namely, specialty areas of
particular strategic significance such as weapons technology
and radioactive materials. The vast majority of all goods and
technology exported from the United States, including
computers and high-technology equipment, are subject instead
to the regulatory power of the Department of Commerce
("Commerce Department" or "the Department"). The Export
Administration Act of 1979 ("the Act"),' 9 as amended, gives
14 The U.S. Constitution grants to Congress the power "[t]o regulate
commerce with foreign nations.... " U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
1" See, e.g., 15 C.F.R. § 770.3(a) (1993) (prohibiting exports of all
commodities and technical data subject to the Commerce Department's
control "unless and until" proper Department licenses are established or
granted).
" The Department of State oversees the export of all military
commodities and technology under the authority of the Arms Export Control
Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2751 et seq. (1988), as implemented by the International
Traffic in Arms Regulations. 22 C.F.R. §§ 120.7-130.17 (1993).
17 Pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011 et seq.
(1988), and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, 22 U.S.C. §§ 3201 et
seq. (1988), the Department of Energy supervises foreign trade in certain
nuclear materials, devices, and related technology. The implementing
regulations for the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Act of 1978 are found at 10 C.F.R. §§ 110, 810 (1993).
" The export ofvarious narcotic and non-narcotic substances is governed
by the Drug Enforcement Administration acting under Title III of the
Controlled Substances Import and Export Act. See 21 U.S.C. § 953 (1988).
The regulations implementing Title III of the Controlled Substances Import
and Export Act can be found at 21 C.F.R. § 1312 (1993).
"' 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-20 (1988). In October 1994, Congress
attempted to compromise on draft legislation reauthorizing the Act.
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the Department authority over the export of all commodities
and technology not subject to the regulatory schemes of other
government agencies or Departments." In the event of
jurisdictional ambiguities, line-drawing rules exist to assist in
the identification of the controlling agency.21
2.2. The Regulatory System of the Department of Commerce
The Act is implemented through the Export Administration
Regulations ("Regulations"),22 a complex set of definitions,
guidelines, and licensing requirements and restrictions
occupying over four hundred pages of Title 15 of the Code of
Federal Regulations ("C.F.R.").
2.2.1. Definitions
The C.F.R. defines a "commodity" as "[a]ny article,
material, or supply except technical data."23 "Technology" is
defined generally as "[s]pecific information necessary for the
'development,' 'production,' or 'use' of a product."24
Technology can take two forms: (1) technical data, such as
blueprints, manuals or formulae; and (2) technical assistance,
Administration Asks Congress To Renew Export Administration Act For One
Year, 11 Intl Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 38, 1490, 1490 (Sept. 28, 1994)
[hereinafter Administration Asks]. This would be the first comprehensive
reworking of the Act since its enactment in 1979. Special Report: 1994
Trade Outlook, 11 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 3, 102, 114 (Jan. 19, 1994).
The Act expired at the end of June 1994 but it was extended by Congress
until August 20, 1994. President Signs Legislation Extending Export
Administration Act Until Aug. 20, 11 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 27, 1063,
1063 (July 6, 1994). On September 27, 1994, the Clinton administration
asked Congress to extend the Act once more, until September 30, 1995.
Administration Asks, supra, at 1490.
20 In light of the Commerce Department's broad influence in the export
arena, this Comment is confined to a discussion of the Department's
regulatory requirements, prohibitions, and penalties as they apply to the
export of computers and related equipment and technology. For a general
list of items not subject to Department of Commerce export controls, see 15
C.F.R. § 770.10 (1993).
" See Karen R. Smith, A Basic Discussion of U.S. Export Regulations:
What Every Client Needs to Know, 1 FLA. ST. U. J. TRANSNAT'L L. & PoLy
113, 115 (1992).
22 15 C.F.R. §§ 768-99 (1993).
23 Id. § 770.2.
4 Id. § 799.1, Supp. 3.
1994]
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such as consulting, repair, or skills training.25 Technical
data, however, often is used as a blanket term indicating
technical data proper, technical assistance, and software.26
Furthermore, models and prototypes are considered to be both
commodities and technology27 and are controlled as such-in
any specific case the more restrictive requirements apply.2"
The C.F.R. defines "export" quite broadly. The C.F.R.
recognizes three general types of exports: (1) actual shipment
of goods or conveyance of technical information out of the
United States, (2) "release of technical data,"29 and (3)
"reexport" of goods and technology.3 °
28 See id.
2 This understanding of the term "technical data" is explicitly endorsed
in 15 C.F.R. § 779.1 (1993). That section indicates, however, that this
interpretation of the term "will be changed in the future" to reflect the
specific definitions found in 15 C.F.R. § 799.1, Supp. 3, where "technology"
is the blanket term denoting technical data and technical assistance.
In light of this potential definitional change, and to avoid confusion, this
Comment uses "technology," "technical data," "technical information," and
"information" interchangeably to indicate useful information in general,
whether conveyed as assistance, software, or pure data.
27 See 15 C.F.R. § 770.2 (1993) (stating that a commodity is "[any article,
material or supply"); 15 C.F.R. § 799.1, Supp. 3 (noting that technical data
may take the form of "models"); see also Susan Haberman Griffen, Exporting
Biotechnology: The Pitfalls, 16 AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS'N Q.J. 542, 547
(1988-89) (noting that the Regulations consider "models" to be a hybrid class
of commodities/technical data).
28 See Griffen, supra note 27, at 547.
29 15 C.F.R. § 779.1(b) (1993). While the shipment or transmission of
goods or technical data out of the United States is easily seen as an export,
the concept of release is not so transparent. In essence, technical data is
released visually, orally, or via a writing. Id. A release within the United
States is considered an export if the transmission occurs with the
"knowledge or intent" that the information transmitted will be conveyed
beyond U.S. borders. See Griffen, supra note 27, at 547. Any release of
U.S.-origin technical data abroad is also considered an export of U.S.
technology. 15 C.F.R. §§ 779.1(b)(1)(iii), (2)(ii). Scientific collaborations
between U.S. and foreign scientists involving the exchange of information
or prototypes therefore can result in exports of U.S. technology, regardless
of the location of the collaboration. The presentation of U.S.-origin technical
data during a foreign conference also could amount to an export. As noted
above, visual inspection by foreigners of U.S. equipment also can constitute
an export. Id. § 779.1(b)(2)(i). Additionally, the use of technical expertise
acquired in the United States, as in foreign repair work, for example, also
can amount to an export under the C.F.R. definition. Id. § 779.1(b)(2)(iii).
3O 15 C.F.R. § 779.1(c) (1993); see also 15 C.F.R. § 770.2 (defining
"reexport"). Reexport involves the actual shipment of U.S.-origin goods or
data from one foreign country to another. Id §§ 770.2, 779.1(c). In general,
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2.2.2. Policy and Scope of the Regulations
Both the Acte' and the C.F.R.32 express the goals
underlying the use of export controls. The C.F.R. provides:
Export controls ... are used to the extent necessary:
(1) To protect the domestic economy from the excessive
drain of scarce materials... ;
(2) To further significantly the foreign policy of the
United States ... ; and
(3) To exercise the necessary vigilance over exports
from the standpoint of their significance to the national
security of the United States.33
Accordingly, the Act and the C.F.R. address three basic forms
of export control: (1) short supply controls;34 (2) foreign
policy controls;35 and (3) national security controls.36 The
requirements and restrictions referred to collectively as short
supply controls implement the policy concerns of section
770.1(a)(1) of the Regulations. As the name suggests, this type
of export control curtails the flow of certain goods out of the
United States in order to prevent their domestic scarcity.
Natural resources make up the majority of commodities
regulated for short supply reasons.3" Short supply controls,
however, form a relatively small percentage of the overall
the reexport of commodities is prohibited unless the commodity in question
could have been exported initially from the United States to the reexport
destination. Id. § 774.1-.2. For technical data, the regulations governing
reexport parallel those governing releases. Thus, any release of U.S.-origin
technical information in a foreign country with the knowledge or intent that
the information will be passed on to another foreign country constitutes
reexport. Id. § 779.1(c). Visual inspection of U.S. facilities or equipment
abroad can also amount to reexport, as can the use of personal knowledge
gained in the United States. Id. § 779.1(1), (3).
31 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402 (1988).
32 15 C.F.R. § 770.1(a) (1993).
3 15 C.F.R. § 770.1(a) (1993). Similar language in the Act appears at 50
U.S.C. app. § 2402 (1988).
3" 50 U.S.C. app. § 2406 (1988).
3 5 Id § 2405.
3, Id. § 2404.
" Examples of these resources include western red cedar and certain
kinds of petroleum and petroleum products. 15 C.F.R. §§ 777.6, 777 (Supp.
2), and 777.7 (Supp. 4) (1993).
1994]
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export regime. 8s  Most regulated exports involve
manufactured goods, such as computers, telecommunications
equipment, and related technology, which are much more
likely to be controlled for foreign policy or national security
reasons.
39
From a practical standpoint, foreign policy controls are
often indistinguishable from national security controls,
although their goals are somewhat different. Foreign policy
controls prohibit or curtail the flow of goods and technology
from the United States for international political reasons, such
as maintenance of an embargo.40 National security controls,
on the other hand, restrict trade in any materials, equipment,
or technology that would enhance the military power of a
foreign nation to the detriment of U.S. security.41 Both of
these controls are applied broadly,42  leading to the
classification of many types of commodities or technology as
"dual use" items that have both commercial and military
applications.43  This is important for the exporter of
computers and telecommunications equipment because many
types of computers, electronics, and software are considered
"dual-use" items. Despite the fact that these items are not
weapons per se, they nevertheless may be subject to national
security controls.44
s See Smith, supra note 21, at 116.
8 Id at 116-17 (noting that national security controls and foreign policy
controls apply to computers and other electronic equipment); see generally
15 C.F.R. § 799 (setting out the Commerce Control List ("CCL"), an
examination of which reveals the vast number of goods and information that
are subject to Commerce Department export control, many for national
security or foreign policy reasons).
'0 See 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2402(2)(B), 2405(a)(1); see also Smith, supra note
19, at 117 (identifying goods subject to foreign policy controls).
41 50 U.S.C. app § 2402 (1988).
42 See Smith, supra note 21, at 116.
"' See TPCC Plan, supra note 6, at 1658. These items are subject to
national security controls, or foreign policy controls, or both. For example,
seals and gaskets made from fluorinated compounds and designed for
aircraft or aerospace use are subject to controls for reasons of national
security. See 15 C.F.R. § 799.1 Supp. 1 (1993), ECCN 1A01A. Additionally,
some "composite structures or laminates" are subject to similar controls due
to their potential use in missile systems. See id. ECCN 1A02A. For an
explanation of the ECCN system, see infra notes 51-54 and accompanying
text.
4' See, e.g., 15 C.F.R. § 799.1, Supp. 1, ECCN 4A01A (1993) (regulating
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2.2.3. Licensing
The Commerce Department supervises the export of all
goods and technology under its control through the use and
enforcement of a comprehensive licensing system. With
certain exceptions, the Department prohibits all exports
subject to its regulation unless the exporter obtains the proper
license or authorization from the Department's Office of Export
Licensing.45 Exceptions to this licensing requirement include
all exports to Canada for use in Canada (unless otherwise
indicated)," and certain exports for official consumption by
the U.S. Armed Forces.47
To facilitate and standardize license processing, the
Commerce Department utilizes a licensing system that
considers the proposed export's destination and catalogues
each item sought to be exported based on its general nature,
its characteristics, or its capabilities. This system is organized
around Country Groups48 and the Commerce Control List
("CCL"), which categorizes all commodities and technologies
subject to the Department's export controls.49  This
categorization system permits exports to certain countries and
denies them to others.50
The CCL system produces a specific five-character Export
Control Classification Number ("ECCN") for each item, group
of related items, or type of technology included in the CCL.5'
Each ECCN entry indicates the products or technologies it
covers, the functions, characteristics, or specifications of those
"[ellectronic computers and related equipment"); id. ECCN 4A03A
(regulating "'[d]igital computers', 'assemblies', and related equipment"); id.
ECCN 4D01A (regulating certain types of software); id. ECCN 5A02A
(regulating "'[telecommunication transmission equipment'... having any
of [certain listed] characteristics, functions, or features").
45 Id, §§ 770.3(a), 772.1(b).
4 Id& § 770.3(a)(1).
"' I& § 770.3(a)(2).
48 Id_ § 770, Supp. 1. All foreign countries are separated, based on
foreign policy and national security concerns, into seven Country Groups,
lettered Q, S, T, V, W, Y, and Z. Id.
4 Id. § 799.1, Supp. 1. See also Smith, supra note 21, at 121-22
(reviewing the CCL).
" For a more detailed description of the structure of the CCL and a
listing of the Country Groups, see infra Appendix I.
6' See 15 C.F.R. § 799.1(c) (1993).
1994]
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items, and the export licensing requirements involved.5"
Each ECCN is associated with a specific commodity or type of
technology and does not change unless the commodity or
technology changes, or the Department specifically changes
it.5 3  The Regulations provide further descriptions of
commodities falling within each ECCN to assist exporters in
matching their products with the correct ECCNs," a
necessary first step in the license application process.
2.2.4. General and Validated Licenses
With certain specific exceptions, "the export from the
United States of all commodities, and all technical data ... is
... prohibited unless and until a general license authorizing
such export shall have been established or a validated license
or other authorization for such export shall have been granted
. . . ,)55 General licenses, created by the Department, exist as
standing licenses; the export of goods or technology covered by
a general license requires neither an application by the
exporter nor a document from the Department. If the goods or
information sought to be exported qualify for one of the
62 See id § 799.1, Supp. 1. For example, "[c]omputers for fingerprint
equipment" are listed under ECCN 4A80C. Id. The first digit of the ECCN
indicates the general category of the CCL into which the commodity falls,
in this case category 4 (computers). The second character of the ECCN, "A"
in this example, identifies the good as some type of equipment, component,
or assembly. Next, the "80" indicates that computers falling within this
ECCN are subject to other licensing controls. An examination of the listing
itself shows that exports of these computers are restricted for foreign policy
reasons. Id. Finally, the "C" indicates that the export of these computers
to any nation other than Canada, Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and
members of NATO is prohibited unless the proper license is granted by the
Commerce Department. Id.; see also § 799.1(b)(4) (explaining the possible
denotations of the fifth letter of the ECCN).
This example is offered for illustrative purposes only. The dissolution
of the Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls ("COCOM")
and the establishment of a successor organization may alter the actual
requirements for the exports of computers listed under ECCN 4A80C. See
section 4.1, infra, for a discussion of the traditional mission of COCOM and
section 4.3, infra, for a discussion of the dismantling of COCOM.
" See Smith, supra note 21, at 122.
64 Exporters can refer to the "Commodity Interpretations" material found
at 15 C.F.R. § 799.2, Supp. 1 (1993) for assistance in determining the exact
scope of any particular ECCN.
" Id- § 770.3(a).
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approximately twenty different types of general licenses, 56
the exporter need only identify on its shipping documents
which license authorizes the export.
5 7
Exporters should, however, be aware of the possibility that
a proposed export, while valid under a general license, may be
prohibited by a "special restriction" of the Regulations. A
special restriction prohibits the export of specific goods and
technology to certain country destinations or to individual
purchasers who have violated U.S. export laws.58 It is the
exporter's duty to determine whether the proposed export is
prohibited by a special restriction.59
Validated licenses authorize the export of goods and
information not covered by any of the general licenses.60 The
66 Of the general licenses available, general license G-DEST is broadest
in scope. It authorizes the export, to any destination, of any commodity on
the CCL for which a validated license is not required. Id. § 771.3(a).
General license G-TEMP authorizes the export of certain commodities
or software for temporary use overseas. Id. § 771.22(a). The exported
material must be returned to the country of export as soon as it has served
its purpose but, with only limited exceptions, no later than one year after
export. Id.
Two general licenses exist for the export of specific types of technical
data: general licenses GTDA and GTDR. Id. § 779.2. General license
GTDA authorizes the unrestricted export of "publicly available" information.
Id. § 779(3)(a)(1). Information is publicly available "when it becomes
generally accessible to the interested public," through media distribution,
publication, open discussion at conferences or seminars, etc. Id. § 779.3(b).
Restricted information not available to the world at large does not qualify
for general license GTDA, but it may be exported under general license
GTDR subject to certain restrictions set forth in the Regulations. Id.
§ 779.4.
7 IJd § 771.2(b).
68 See, e.g., id. § 785 (enumerating the special country restrictions); id.
§ 788, Supp. 1. (listing persons prohibited from participating in U.S. export
transactions). This listing, as well as the Regulations in general, are
updated via the Federal Register. See id. § 788(a)(2), Supp. 1; Smith, supra
note 21, at 117 n.27.
, See 15 C.F.R. § 771.2(c).
o There are four basic types of validated licenses. An "Individual
License" authorizes the export of technical data or a specified amount of
goods on a specific date to an identified foreign buyer. Id. § 772.2(b)(1). A
"Project License" allows the export, for approximately one year, of all goods
and technology required for the completion of a specific activity, such as a
construction project. Id. § 772.2(b)(2); Smith, supra note 21, at 119.
"Distribution Licenses" authorize exports of various commodities to
approved foreign distributors or users for a period of one year, or, in specific
instances, two years. 15 C.F.R. § 772.2(b)(3) (1993). Finally, "Service
1994]
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exporter must apply for a validated license and the proposed
export cannot occur unless the license is issued by the
Commerce Department's Office of Export Licensing.6 ' If the
license is not granted, the exporter may appeal the
Department's decision to the Assistant Secretary of Commerce
for Export Administration. 2
The application and review process is considered necessary
because goods and technology requiring validated licenses
often raise significant foreign policy or national security
concerns. Indeed, the sensitive nature of the material itself
requires that such exports have validated licenses in the first
place. Not surprisingly, these licenses are very limited in
scope. They usually authorize only the shipment of specific
goods or information to a named foreign purchaser for a
limited period of time. 3  Moreover, they may not be
transferred or reused, even for an identical transaction."
2.2.5. Enforcement and Penalties
The U.S. Customs Service enforces the Department's
licensing system. 5 Noncompliance with the Regulations
subjects the exporter to criminal punishment,6" civil
Supply Licenses" allow U.S. exporters to ship spare or replacement parts to
certain Country Groups in order to service equipment previously made or
exported by the licensee. Id. § 772.2(b)(6).
8 15 C.F.R. § 772.1(b) (1993).
62 Id. § 789.2(a) (1993).
63 See Smith, supra note 21, at 121-22.
64 1d
6' See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2411(a) (1988); Griffen, supra note 27, at 543-44.
Note that the U.S. Customs Service is an agency within the Department of
the Treasury, not the Department of Commerce.
" Anyone who "knowingly violates or conspires to or attempts to violate"
any section of the Act or the Regulations can be fined up to five times the
value of the exports involved or $50,000, whichever is greater, or jailed for
up to five years, or both. See 50- U.S.C. app. § 2410(a) (1988); 15 C.F.R.
§ 787.1(a)(1)(i) (1993). Except in the case of individuals, an entity that
willfully violates the Act or the Regulations, with the knowledge that the
exports in question are bound for, or will benefit, a controlled country, can
be fined $1,000,000 or five times the value of the goods or technology
involved. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2410(b)(1)(A) (1988); 15 C.F.R.
§ 787.1(a)(1)(ii)(A) (1993). Individuals who intentionally violate the Act may
be fined up to $250,000 or imprisoned for up to ten years, or both. See 50
U.S.C. § 2410(b)(1)(B); 15 C.F.R. § 787.1(a)(1)(ii)(A) (1993). Further, anyone
convicted of knowingly or willfully violating a provision of the Act or the
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penalties,"' and administrative sanctions.6 " Before any civil
penalties may be imposed, however, the Department must
issue a formal complaint. The charged party also may request
a hearing before an administrative law judge. 9
Regulations regarding goods or technology subject to national security
controls must forfeit to the states the commodities or data in question, any
property used in the unlawful export or attempt to export, and any cash or
personal property derived, directly or indirectly, from the violation. See 50
U.S.C. app. § 2410(g)(1)(A)-(C) (1988) (Section 2410(g)(2) provides that
forfeitures under § 2410(g)(1) are subject to the due process protections of
18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1988)); 15 C.F.R. § 787.1(b)(4) (1993).
67 The Secretary of Commerce can impose civil penalties of up to $10,000
for each violation of the Act or the Regulations. See 50 U.S.C. app.
§ 2410(c)(1) (1988); 15 C.F.R. § 787.1(b)(3) (1993). In the case of violations
involving national security controls, fines of up to $100,000 may be levied.
See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2410(c)(1) (1988); 15 C.F.R. § 787.1(b)(3) (1993). It
should be noted that these penalties may be imposed in addition to or in
place of any other types of penalties imposed. See 50 U.S.C. app.
§ 2410(c)(1) (1988); 15 C.F.R. § 787.1(b)(3) (1993).
68 See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2410(c)(2)(A) (1988); 15 C.F.R. § 787.1(b)(1)-(2)
(1993). Perhaps the most devastating administrative sanction is the "denial
order." At the Secretary's discretion, no individual or entity convicted of
violating the Act, the Regulations, or any license or order issued under the
Act, may apply for or use any export license under the Act for up to 10 years
following the date of conviction. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2410(h)(1); see also 15
C.F.R. § 787.1(b)(1) (1993) (discussing the denial order, but omitting
discussion of time limit after conviction). Denial orders and other
administrative sanctions may be issued only after notice and opportunity for
hearing. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2410(c)(2)(B).
Temporary denial orders, however, may be issued without a hearing if
the Department determines that it is necessary to prevent an "imminent
violation" of the Act, the Regulations, or any order or license issued under
the Act. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2412(d)(1); 15 C.F.R. § 788.19(a)(1), (b)(1) (1993).
These orders are effective for a maximum of 180 days but can be renewed
if necessary to prevent an imminent violation. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2412(d)(1).
Renewals must be in writing and can only issue after notice and an
opportunity for hearing. Id.; 15 C.F.R. § 788.19(d)(1)-(2) (1993). Moreover,
the initial issuance of a temporary denial order and any renewal of a
temporary order can be appealed by the person or persons subject to the
order. 50 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2); 15 C.F.R. § 788.19(e) (1993).
B 50 U.S.C. app. § 2412(c)(1) (1988). After the hearing, the
administrative law judge must forward a written decision to the Secretary
of Commerce, who must affirm, vacate, or modify the decision within 30
days of receiving it. Id. The charged party may then appeal the Secretary's
decision, within 15 days of its issuance, to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit. Id. § 2412(c)(1), (3).
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3. THE EFFECTS OF SELF-IMPOSED HINDRANCES
ON U.S. EXPORTS
Self-imposed restrictions on U.S. export practices in
general, and on the export of high-technology equipment in
particular, are detrimental to U.S. businesses. For many
years, the Department has implemented unilateral export
controls in the name of national security or foreign policy
without adequately considering the costs involved. ° The
economic costs of such overly-protective regulatory activity fall
primarily on U.S. businesses. Businesses incur costs in the
form of lost sales (and lost profits from future sales) caused by
the decrease in foreign market shares due to the perceived
inability of U.S. firms to deliver commodities consistently. 1
For example, on August 24, 1993, the United States
imposed sanctions on China and Pakistan in response to a
determination by the U.S. intelligence community that China
had shipped certain missile components to Pakistan in October
1992.72 The sanctions prohibited any new sales of satellites,
satellite technology, and related equipment, such as rocket
components and flight control systems, for two years from the
date that sanctions were imposed. 3  Lynn E. Davis,
Undersecretary of State for International Security Affairs,
stated that the primary effect of the sanctions would be to
prevent use of Chinese rockets to launch U.S.-made
satellites. 4 Davis also noted that the sanctions would affect
an estimated $400 to $500 million in U.S. sales to China each
year.
7 5
70 See Steven D. Overly, Regulation of Critical Technologies Under the
Export Administration Act of 1979 and the Proposed Export Administration
Amendments of 1983: American Business Versus National Security, 10 N.C.
J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 423, 446 & n.156 (1985).
71 See id. at 446 & n.157.
72 See 58 Fed. Reg. 45,408 (1993); see also Norman Kempster & Rone
Tempest, U.S. Imposes Sanctions on China, Pakistan Over Missile Deal, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 26, 1993, at A8 (discussing sanctions imposed on China and
Pakistan).
71 See 58 Fed. Reg. 45,408 (1993); U.S., Citing Arms Transfer, Bars Some
Sales of Advanced Technology to China, Pakistan, 10 Intl Trade Rep. (BNA)
No. 35, 1444-45 (Sept. 1, 1993) [hereinafter U.S. Bars Sales of Advanced
Technology].
"4 See id. at 1445; Kempster & Tempest, supra note 72, at A8.
71 U.S. Bars Sales of Advanced Technology, supra note 73, at 1444-45.
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The United States, however, is not the only nation capable
of manufacturing satellites. Less than three months after the
sanctions took effect, German and Chinese negotiators signed
a memorandum of understanding indicating China's intent to
purchase up to twenty German-made satellites."8 For one
U.S. company in the satellite technology business, Hughes
Electronics, the Sino-German agreement represents a potential
$2 billion in lost sales."'
The U.S. government also has borne the economic costs of
its own over-regulation. For instance, the government pays a
substantial amount of money to implement and monitor an
increasing number of complex export controls.7" Perhaps
more strikingly, unilateral regulatory action by the
government has at times necessitated the passing of special
compensatory legislation designed to offset the impact of
stringent export controls on the private sector.7" Although it
is not related to the trade in computers or high-technology
equipment, the Carter Administration's grain embargo against
the Soviet Union in the wake of the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan on December 26, 1979 is an example of this
phenomenon.8" The embargo blocked grain sales to the
Soviets by U.S. farmers from January 4, 1980 through April
24, 1981, when President Reagan terminated it. 8 During
this period, the embargo disallowed the export of
approximately 13 million metric tons of corn and 4 million
metric tons of wheat.8 2 The embargo also prevented the
prospective sales of 1.3 million metric tons of soybean meal
7 See Simon Beck, Hughes Chief Blasts U.S. on China Trade Sanctions,
S. CHINA MORNING PosT, Jan. 21, 1994, at 14; see also Uli Schmetzer, In
Kohl's China Visit, Business Comes First, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 17, 1993, at 6
(noting Germany's success in procuring billions of dollars in Chinese
contracts).
" See Beck, supra note 76, at 14. For example, Hughes lost a $100
million order by China for two telecommunications satellites. China
contracted with a German company to fill this order. Id. (summarizing
statements of Michael Armstrong, chief executive of Hughes Electronics).
" See Overly, supra note 70, at 446 & n.157.
7 Id. at 446 & n.159.
80 Id. at 451.
8' Id- at 451, 454.
82 1& at 455 n.201 (citing Export Administration Act ("EAA') 1980
Annual Report, OFFICE OF EXPORT ADMIN., DEPT. OF COMMERCE, EXPORT
ADMIN. ANN. REP. FY 1980, at 146 (1981)).
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and 65 thousand tons of poultry, which were being negotiated
when the embargo w~s established.8" In response to the
hardship it caused U.S. farmers, the government established
compensatory grain programs costing more than $2.5
billion." Ultimately, the embargo cost the United States
"approximately $11.4 billion in national output ... and $3.1
billion in personal income."8" The embargo itself placed no
significant burden on the Soviets, who were able to purchase
the grain they required from three U.S. allies-Canada,
Australia, and Argentina-each of which increased its
production and market share as a result.8 6 Although high-
technology products, and not agricultural goods, are the focus
of this Comment, 7 the above example illustrates the hidden
costs that may be generated by unilateral export
restrictions.88
The U.S. government also bears certain non-economic costs
resulting from restrictive unilateral export controls. These
costs include strained relations between the United States and
countries denied access to desired goods due to U.S. export
policies8" and the resentment and frustration of U.S.
83 1d.
84 1d. at 455.
" Id. at 455-56 (citation omitted).
86 Id. at 456-57 & n.208.
87 An exhaustive search by the author has uncovered no commensurate
example of this phenomenon with regard to the U.S. export of computers
and/or high-technology equipment.
88 William A. Reinsch, current Undersecretary of Commerce for Export
Administration, has identified the grain embargo as a prime example of
"frustration overcoming rationality" and has stated his belief that "the
damage to the credibility of U.S. farmers ... as reliable suppliers of goods
far outweighed the impact we had on Soviet policy." Public Support for
Economic Sanctions Seen Likely to 'Inevitably Erode,' 11 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) No. 14, at 531, 532 (Apr. 6, 1994).
8 See, e.g., Amy Kaslow, Arms Control vs. Saving Jobs: Critics Say the
Administration's High-Tech Export Policy Protects Jobs but Threatens
Global Security, CHRISTIAN ScI. MONITOR, Jan. 24, 1994, at 11, 12 (quoting
Brazil's Ambassador to the United States, Paolo-Tarso Flecha de Lima, on
the cost of negotiating the importation of U.S. products).
Ambassador Flecha de Lima urges the United States to "'take into
account the track record of the countries involved. [Brazil has] not been at
war for over 130 years, and [borders] 10 countries with whom [it has] good
relations.'" Id. at 12. Brazil's complaints, however, may soon be addressed.
The United States recently named Brazil, along with nine other "emerging
markets," as a primary target of future U.S. export promotion efforts. See
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businesses that can only sit by idly while foreign competitors
not burdened by such export restraints expand and take over
potentially lucrative new markets.9 0 In cases where the
goods in question are easily available from foreign sources,
overly-restrictive unilateral export controls clearly are self-
defeating."' Instead, such controls generally transfer jobs
and potential economic growth from the United States to other
nations.92
4. EXPORTING: NEW REGULATIONS
In September 1993, the Clinton Administration unveiled its
new export plan. Notably, this plan, along with certain
measures designed to facilitate exporting in general, relaxes
the restrictions governing. the export of computers and
telecommunications equipment. Essentially, more powerful
computers now are more easily exported to more destinations
than the Regulations previously allowed. In terms of export
procedures, more computers and telecommunications
equipment are now covered by some type of general license,
which greatly simplifies the export of such goods. 3
4.1. Previous Export Requirements: COCOM
Historically, one of the objectives of U.S. export policy was
to deny Communist nations access to Western technology
Commerce Budget for FY 1995 Includes Major Increase for Export
Promotion, 11 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 6, at 214, 215 (Feb. 9, 1994).
" See Overly, supra note 70, at 446 & n.158. Recent German industry
contracting in China is a good example of this. See supra notes 76-77 and
accompanying text.
"' 'All too often, denying U.S. technology and equipment to other nations
fails to inhibit their economic development because leading-edge technology
and equipment can be obtained elsewhere.... In general, unilateral
economic sanctions no longer work.'" Ronald E. Yates, Cold War Trade
Restrictions Called a Burden for Business, CH. TRIB., Apr. 18, 1994, § 4, at
1, 2 (quoting a recent report by the Washington D.C.-based Council on
Competitiveness).
" See Overly, supra note 70, at 446 n.158 (referring to statements by
former Secretary of Commerce Juanita Kreps).
" See Excerpts from Clinton Administration's Report, "Toward a
National Export Strategy," 10 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 38, at 1658, 1658
(Sept. 29, 1993) [hereinafter Excerpts].
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having direct military use." In particular, the United States
sought to restrict Communist access to "dual-use" products. As
noted above, "dual-use" items, including goods and
information, are those which have primarily commercial
applications, but also possess characteristics or capabilities
that could enhance a nation's military potential.9 5 Not
surprisingly, U.S. allies shared these export control objectives.
Thus, in 1949, the United States and several of its allies
formed the Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export
Controls ("COCOM").9" COCOM was "[a] multilateral
organization that cooperate[d] in restricting strategic exports
to controlled countries." 7 The purpose of COCOM was to
establish and maintain a system of export controls designed to
curtail or eliminate the availability of strategic technology to
nations deemed potentially hostile. At the time of its
dissolution, COCOM consisted of seventeen member
nations.9" These nations worked together to compile a list of
goods and technologies considered to be either militarily
sensitive or to have dual-use capabilities. Each member
nation then incorporated this list of controlled commodities
and information, which included many types of computers and
telecommunications equipment, into its respective export
control regime, thereby ensuring consistent export treatment
of strategic goods by Western allies.99
"4 See John F. McKenzie, Implementation of the Core List of Export
Controls: Computer and Software Controls, 5 SoFTWARE L.J. 1, 1 (1992).
" See Excerpts, supra note 93, at 1658. For further discussion of "dual-
use" items, see supra section 2.2.2.
"' See Peter Swan, A Road Map to Understanding Export Controls:
National Security in a Changing Global Environment, 30 Am. BUS. L.J. 607,
619 & n.85 (1993).
97 15 C.F.R. § 770.2 (1993).
"8 Those members were: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France,
the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and
the United States. See 15 C.F.R. § 770.2 (1993). COCOM was dissolved
primarily due to the more favorable political and economic relations between
the United States and its allies and the former Soviet Union, Eastern
Europe, and China. See Eagleburger Says Allied Pressure Will Force End
to COCOM Relatively Soon, supra note 7, at 1610.
"' McKenzie, supra note 94, at 2.
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4.2. Previous Export Requirements: CTP and Mtops
In the Commerce Department's export scheme, the
performance level, or computational ability, of a computer is
expressed in terms of its "composite theoretical performance"
("CTP"). An individual computer's CTP, measured in "millions
of theoretical operations per second" ("Mtops"), is calculated
according to a formula set forth in the CCL.0 0
Computers make up category 4 of the CCL."'0
Previously, the Department required a validated license to
export any digital computer with a CTP greater than 12.5
Mtops. 02 General license authorization made it possible,
however, to export computers having a CTP of 195 Mtops or
less to any COCOM member nation and to Austria, Finland,
Ireland, Sweden, and Switzerland, without obtaining a
validated license. 03 Likewise, computers with a CTP of 20
Mtops or less could be exported under a general license to
most Country Group T and V nations.'" Computer
shipments to Japan were virtually unrestricted because
general license authority allowed such exports regardless of
computer performance level." 5  Generally, however,
computers with a CTP exceeding 12.5 Mtops could not be
exported without a validated license. Correspondingly,
computers with a CTP of 12.5 Mtops or less could be exported,
under general license G-DEST, to any destination other than
Iran and Syria, the embargoed nations of Country Groups S
and T, and South African military and police groups.
10 6
100 Appendix II of this Comment provides a representative list of
computers and corresponding CTP levels.
101 15 C.F.R. § 799.1(b)(1) (1993). The primary entry for digital
computers is ECCN 4A03A. Id. § 779.1, Supp. 1.
102 See id. § 799.1(b)(1); TPCC Plan, supra note 6, at 1645.
103 See 15 C.F.R. § 771.25(b), Supp. 1, ECCN 4A03A (1993) (discussing
general license GCT); McKenzie, supra note 94, at 8.
104 See 15 C.F.R. §§ 799.1, Supp. 1, ECCN 4A03A, 771.23 (1993)
(discussing general license GFW); McKenzie, supra note 94, at 8.
105 See 15 C.F.R. §§ 799.1, Supp. 1, ECCN 4A03A, 771.25 (1993)
(discussing general license GCT).
,oe See id. §§ 799.1, Supp. 1, ECCN 4A03A, 771.3 (1993) (discussing
general license G-DEST); McKenzie, supra note 94, at 9.
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4.3. New Export Requirements
In the months following the announcement of the new
export plan, the Commerce Department dramatically altered
the export control landscape. As of October 1994, the
Department had lifted controls on virtually all
telecommunications equipment and on computers with a
performance capacity of up to 1,000 Mtops, allowing the export
of these goods and technology to all civilian end-users and for
all end-uses in almost any nation in the world,'" with the
exception of "terrorist-supporting" countries." 8
Moreover, as agreed upon during a meeting of the United
States and its COCOM allies in November 1993,109 COCOM
107 These new requirements were enacted on an incremental basis. On
December 9, 1993, national security-based-validated licensing requirements
were eliminated for exports to virtually all destinations of computers with
a CTP not exceeding 67 Mtops. 58 Fed. Reg. 64,674 (1993) (to be codified at
15 C.F.R. pts. 771, 799). These requirements also were eliminated on
computers functioning under 195 Mtops for exports to nations in Country
Groups T and V, with the exception of the People's Republic of China, Iran,
Syria, and South African military and police groups. Id. at 64,674-75.
On February 24, 1994, the Department's Bureau of Export
Administration changed the definition of "supercomputer" to encompass
machines with a CTP equal to or exceeding 1,500 Mtops, up from 195 Mtops.
59 Fed. Reg. 8848 (1994) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pts. 770, 772, 773, 776,
799). At the same time, the Bureau extended general license availability for
exports to most Western nations for computers functioning at 1,000 Mtops
or less. Id. For exports to countries on the "Nuclear Nonproliferation
Special Country List," general license availability was increased to cover
machines with a CTP of 500 Mtops or less. Id. General license cut-offs for
exports to the People's Republic of China and the countries of the former
Soviet Union were also raised to 260 Mtops. Id.
Continuing its rapid pace, the Bureau, on March 21, 1994, lifted
licensing requirements on exports to South Korea of computers operating up
to, but not including, 1,500 Mtops (supercomputers). 59 Fed. Reg. 13,196,
13,197 (1994) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pts. 770, 771, 773, 774).
Finally, on April 4, 1994, with the establishment of general license
availability for shipments of computers of 1,000 Mtops or less to the People's
Republic of China and to Country Groups Q, W, and Y, the licensing
requirements and CTP levels existing as of October 1994 were completed.
59 Fed. Reg. 15,621 (1994) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pts. 771, 774).
108 "Terrorist-supporting" nations were identified as Cuba, Libya, Iran,
Iraq, Sudan, North Korea, and Syria. U.S. Lifts Curbs on High-Tech
Exports Including Telecom Equipment, Computers, 11 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) No. 14, at 530, 530 (Apr. 6, 1994) [hereinafter U.S. Lifts Curbs].
... U.S., Allies Agree to Dismantle COCOM by April 1, 1994, and Set Up
New Regime, 10 Intl Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 46, at 1960, 1960 (Nov. 24,
1993) [hereinafter U.S., Allies Agree].
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ceased to exist on March 31, 1994.110 Former COCOM
nations have agreed to set up a successor multilateral regime
designed to impede weapons proliferation by restricting trade
in dangerous arms and sensitive technologies3"
Restrictions most likely will target "rogue" nations such as
Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea."2 Members of the new
organization could eventually include nations not associated
with COCOM, such as the former Communist nations of
Hungary, Poland, the People's Republic of China, Russia, and
many other former Soviet Republics."' Until the new
regime is in place, COCOM members have agreed to continue
controls on the "most sensitive items and arms as these have
been [identified] in the COCOM lists."" 4 This agreement
will be monitored through group meetings and bilateral
discussions "that will assure [the United States] over the
coming months that [each nation's] policies are essentially the
same."
115
4.4. Assessment of the New Regulations
Prior to the implementation of the Clinton administration's
new export promotion plan, eighty percent of all export license
applications were requested in order to export computers and
high-technology, such as electronics and telecommunications
equipment." 6 Overzealous export regulation in the name of
national security or foreign policy had stunted U.S. economic
progress." 7 The recent changes in export policy regarding
computers and high-technology equipment represent a step
toward alleviating this problem.
110 59 Fed. Reg. 15,621 (1994) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pts. 771, 774).
... See U.S., Allies Agree, supra note 109, at 1961.
"' Russian Membership in Post-COCOM Regime Impeded by Arms Sales
to Iran, Davis Says, 11 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 15, at 568, 568 (Apr. 13,
1994) [hereinafter Russian Membership].
11' See U.S., Allies Agree, supra note 109, at 1960.
114 Russian Membership, supra note 112, at 568 (quoting statement of
Lynn E. Davis, Undersecretary of State for International Security Affairs).
Id.
* See TPCC Plan, supra note 6, at 1645.
11 See id. (quoting from statement of Commerce Secretary Ronald H.
Brown).
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4.4.1. National Security vs. Business Competitiveness
The most beneficial changes for the U.S. computer and
high-technology industries represented by the new export
promotion plan are the liberalization of controls on goods and
technology that are no longer truly sensitive or are freely
available overseas, and a commitment to eliminating
unilateral export controls, including reexport controls, unless
they are mandated by "overriding national interests.""'
Thus far, industry reaction to the administration's plan has
been positive."'
Some critics argue, however, that the deregulation of "dual-
use" technology such as computers and telecommunications
equipment represents a dangerous preference for U.S. business
interests over national security concerns.'20 These critics
suggest that the administration, in its rush to promote exports
and jobs through deregulation, has contradicted its own policy
of non-proliferation.' Critics note that the recently
decontrolled high-technology equipment is exactly the type of
equipment that is needed by "rogue" states to increase their
weapons development and production capabilities.' 22 To
118 Id. at 1659.
11 Responding to export decontrols to China and the former Soviet
Union, made official on Apr. 4, 1994, Christopher A. Padilla, director of
federal government affairs for AT&T, stated: "[Tlhis is a blockbuster....
It's exactly what we've been looking for. This clearly is a home run for the
Clinton administration." U.S. Lifts Curbs, supra note 108, at 530. Also
commending the administration, Dick Iverson, president and chief executive
officer of the American Electronics Association, said "President Clinton's
team deserves a round of applause." Id.
120 See, e.g., Lally Weymouth, Good News for Rogue States, WASH. POST,
Feb. 4, 1994, at A19; Kaslow, supra note 89, at 11.
121 See Weymouth, supra note 120, at A19 (quoting then Secretary of
Defense Les Aspin calling nuclear weapons the danger "that most urgently
and directly threatens America at home and American interests abroad,"
and calling for a counter-proliferation initiative); Kaslow, supra note 89, at
12 (quoting Kenneth Luongo, arms-control and international security expert
for the Union of Concerned Scientists, claiming that "[Clinton
Administration personnel] have not fully grasped the contradiction they're
living.").
12 See Weymouth, supra note 120, at A19. In response to the Commerce
Department's March 31, 1994 announcement outlining its latest decontrol,
Gary Milhollin, director of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control,
stated:
It is a fantasy to think that you can ship strategic computers to
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these observers, deregulation of this high-technology
equipment is detrimental to U.S. national security.
This argument is admirably practical and cautionary, but
in the end it fails to recognize post-Cold War trade realities.
The old U.S. export regulations governing computers and high-
technology equipment were crafted at a time when the United
States was clearly the leader in developing and manufacturing
these types of goods. The Clinton administration, while
sensitive to proliferation concerns, realizes that high-
technology equipment is available now from many more
countries than it was in the past."'3 If a country cannot
receive high-technology equipment from the United States, it
now can turn to any one of several other countries to obtain
the desired goods. In this landscape, the old U.S. export
controls are outdated-more than simply being ineffective,
they are harmful to U.S. businesses as well."
Unnecessarily strict export controls cannot be maintained if
the United States hopes to remain competitive in world
markets,'25 which it must, given the importance of exports
places like China and Romania and not have them end up in places
like Iran .... [The recent deregulation] means that every bomb and
missile maker in the world will save time and money by using what
are practically the most powerful U.S. computers available....
The happiest people in the world tonight are in Pakistan, India, and
North Korea, because they can now obtain, through front
companies, computer power that previously was beyond their
wildest dreams.
Thomas L. Friedman, U.S. Ending Curbs on High-Tech Gear to Cold War
Foes, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1994, at Al, D5.
123 "Alot of these [export control] laws were written in another era - that
was when the only way you could buy anything of quality was from the US
[sic] .... That's just not the case anymore. Many countries out there have
huge significant technology sectors or capacities." Kaslow, supra note 89,
at 12 (statements of an unnamed "senior [Clinton] administration official").
124 An Iranian buyer of high-tech machinery has stated: "[J]ust ask
anyone. It's easy to get around the controls. America's European and Asian
friends are perfectly happy to accommodate requests for what is unavailable
from the US [sic] . . . ." Kaslow, supra note 89, at 12.
12 In 1992, then Acting Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger,
stated:
We are in an era, where, if we don't wake up to the fact that how
we handle export policy is crucial to the whole question of our
international competitiveness, we are going to be in very deep
trouble.... I see it every day in this office, where the French or the
Germans or the British or the Japanese or whomever because of the
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to the U.S. economy.'26 The new export promotion plan does
not ignore weapons proliferation concerns; 2 rather it
attempts, through control of only the most sensitive high-
technology equipment, to balance these concerns with the
important issue of U.S. competitiveness in an increasingly
global economy.1
28
4.4.2. Efficiency Issues
The new export promotion plan also attempts to increase
efficiency. Deregulating the export of a greater number of
non-critical or widely available goods allows the Department
to redirect resources that otherwise would be involved in
license processing, license referral, and in the policing of
way in which their government supports exports ... has an
advantage over the American competitor that drives me crazy.
R. Jeffrey Smith, Selling To Scoundrels: Why We Won't Stop, WASH. POST,
Nov. 15, 1992, at C1, C4.
126 Commerce Secretary Ronald Brown emphasized the economic
significance of loosening export regulations in his statement to the House
Subcommittee:
Between 1986 and 1993, for example, nearly 40 percent of the
growth of the Nation's Gross Domestic Product resulted from U.S.
exports of goods and services. Between 1986 and 1992 (the most
recent year for which data are available), the number of jobs
associated with exports rose from 6.7 million to over 10 million.
Moreover, jobs supported by goods exports paid 13 percent more
than the average wage.
Prepared Statement By Ronald Brown, supra note 12.
For another statement on the economic impact of the relaxing of export
regulations, see also Kaslow, supra note 89, at 12 (quoting Jeffrey Garten,
the Undersecretary of Commerce for International Trade: "The ability to
sustain [the current economic recovery] depends on the ability to penetrate
world markets.").
127 The administration's current involvement in the creation of a
successor to COCOM is evidence of its focus on restricting the access of
"rogue" states to truly sensitive arms and technology. See supra notes 99-
115 and accompanying text.
12 A statement issued from the White House elaborated on this point:
From the outset, this Administration has been committed to combatting
the proliferation of dangerous weapons and sensitive technologies, while
at the same time insuring that American workers and firms remain the
most competitivein the world. Our policies seek to balance these goals.
As global technology advances, export controls must be updated in order
to remain focused on those items that still make a difference to
programs of proliferation concern.
Friedman, supra note 122, at D5.
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potential reexport transactions. These resources now can be
used to guard more effectively against truly harmful reexports
of critical weapons proliferation technologies. An additional
benefit of these changes is a reduction in paperwork and a
corresponding facilitation of the entire licensing process.129
4.4.3. Questions and Recommendations
The Clinton administration's new export promotion plan is
comprehensive and well-conceived but raises certain questions
and poses certain problems that the administration and the
Department will need to address. For example, while the
administration has implemented time limits within which the
Department must process license applications 130 and while
the Department itself is committed to improving license
processing and interagency referrals generally,'31 it is not
clear whether its efforts to streamline the application and
referral process will be reviewed on a regular basis and, if so,
at what time intervals. Ideally, the Department should
institute frequent reviews in order to monitor the progress of
the new plan.
Further, given the collapse of the Democratic West versus
Communist East dichotomy, and the resulting "New World
Order," the Department should review and refine the CCL
continually in order to maximize U.S. export potential. When
the Department determines that a controlled item, or its
functional equivalent, actually is available from foreign
sources, U.S. export controls on that item should be changed
or removed altogether. While the new export promotion plan
does call for annual review of unilateral controls,3 2 a
continual, "rolling" review throughout the fiscal year would
better promote the interests of U.S. businesses by facilitating
the immediate alteration or elimination of any unnecessary or
excessive export controls.
This type of constant refinement, to the extent that it
129 The Department of Commerce received roughly 25,000 license
applications in 1993. Export reforms implemented as of early April 1994 are
expected to reduce this figure by approximately 50 percent. See U.S. Lifts
Curbs, supra note 108, at 530.
130 TPCC Plan, supra note 6, at 1660.
131 Id
1'2 Id. at 1659.
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increases the amount of detail in the already complex
Regulations, could result in greater delays for potential U.S.
exporters due to an increase in the amount of time it takes the
Department to process validated licenses. Any potential
increase in processing time, however, theoretically will be
offset by a concomitant decrease in the number of items
requiring validated licenses in the first place. In other words,
general licenses will be expanded, under the new export
promotion plan, to cover an increasing number of regulated
items. As the number of items falling under general license
authorization increases, the burden on the Department's
license processing mechanisms will decrease accordingly.
Additionally, the proposed streamlining of the Department's
procedures and interagency dealings, to the extent that it
increases the Department's efficiency, will counterbalance any
potential increase in license processing time due to an increase
in the complexity of the Regulations.
5. CONCLUSION
The Clinton administration's new export promotion plan is
a realistic response to present economic conditions. The
collapse of the Communist empire at the end of the 1980s
created an environment in which Cold War economic planning
was outdated and unnecessary. The administration's export
promotion plan updates certain outmoded and inefficient U.S.
export regulations that were based on Cold War economic and
military theories. The plan does this while at the same time
striking a delicate balance between national security concerns
and the interests of U.S. businesses.
The new plan is still in its infancy and it remains to be
seen if it ultimately will be successful in increasing U.S.
exports of high-technology items over the long term. The plan
will require constant monitoring and refinement in order to
achieve its objectives, but at present, it has eliminated certain
long-standing obstacles to U.S. computer and high-technology
exporting.
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APPENDIX I: COUNTRY GROUPS, THE COMMERCE CONTROL
LIST, AND EXPORT CONTROL CLASSIFICATION NUMBERS
The Commerce Department's licensing system is organized
around Country Groups,' the Commerce Control List,1M
and Export Control Classification Numbers.135 Under the
Regulations, all foreign countries are separated into seven
Country Groups, lettered Q, S, T, V, W, Y, and Z. i3 6 A
particular export may be allowed to one Country Group and
denied to another, or allowed to several and denied to some,
etc. Foreign policy and national security concerns guide both
the placement of a particular nation into a particular Country
Group and the permissibility of exports to that nation and
Country Group. For example, Group Z is comprised of North
Korea, Vietnam, and Cuba.3 7 U.S. foreign policy greatly
restricts trade with each of these nations; they therefore are
placed in their own Country Group for export purposes.3 "
The Commerce Control List ("CCL") is set up and
maintained by the Department's Bureau of Export
Administration." 9 It lists all commodities and technology
subject to the Department's export controls. The CCL is
divided into ten numbered categories including materials,
electronics, and avionics.1 40  Each of these categories, in
turn, is divided into five product groups, lettered A through
133 15 C.F.R. § 770, Supp. 1 (1993).
134 Ia §§ 799.1, § 799.1, Supp. 1.
135 I& § 799.1(c).
136 Id. § 770, Supp. 1.
137 Id.
13 See Smith, supra note 21, at 117 & n.26.
's 15 C.F.R. § 799.1(a) (1993).
140 The categories are as follows:
(1) Materials
(2) Materials Processing
(3) Electronics
(4) Computers
(5) Telecommunications and Cryptography
(6) Sensors
(7) Avionics and Navigation
(8) Marine Technology
(9) Propulsion Systems and Transportation Equipment
(10) Miscellaneous
Ia § 799.1(b)(1).
19941
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E." 1 Specific items or sets of related items listed in each
product group are further identified by a two-digit number
indicating the particular type of export control placed on that
item or set of items.14 It is important to note that the type
of export control indicated by this two-digit number may not
be the only control affecting the item in question.'41  Lastly,
each commodity or type of technology is assigned a code letter,
A through 1, which indicates the documentation requirements
necessary to export that item to a nation within any particular
Country Group.'"
141 The five groups are as follows:
(A) Equipment, Assemblies and Components
(B) Production and Test Equipment
(C) Materials
(D) Software
(E) Technology
Id. § 799.1(b)(2).
14 The two-digit numbering system is as follows:
01-19-COCOM controls
20-39-Missile Technology controls
40-59-Nuclear non-proliferation controls
60-79-Chemical and biological weapons controls
80-99-Other controls
Id. § 799.1(b)(3). COCOM no longer exists. See section 4.1, supra, for a
discussion of the traditional mission of COCOM, and section 4.3, supra, for
a discussion of the organization's dismantling.
143 15 C.F.R. § 799.1(b)(3) ("Although each set of digits represents a
particular type of control, there may also be other controls that affect the
same items.").
The CCL lists the specific reason(s) for controlling the export of each
item or set of related items. There are six possible reasons for control: 1)
national security; 2) missile technology; 3) nuclear proliferation; 4) chemical
or biological warfare concerns; 5) foreign policy controls; and 6) short supply
concerns. Id. § 799.1 (d)(1)(iii). For example, specified "[e]lectronic
computers and related equipment," along with "'assemblies' and specially
designed components therefor" are given the export control number "01."
This indicates control of exports of these computers and assemblies for
COCOM reasons. An examination of the section, however, indicates that
these items are also controlled for missile technology and nuclear
proliferation concerns. Id. § 799.1, Supp. 1 (ECCN 4A01A).
144Id. § 799.1(b)(4).
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APPENDIX I (CONTINUED): COUNTRY GROUPS 4 5
Country Group Q
Romania
Country Group S
Libya
Country Group T
North America
Northern Area:
Greenland
Miquelon and St. Pierre Islands
Southern Area:
Mexico (including Cozumel and Revilla Gigedo Islands)
Central America
Belize
Costa Rica
El Salvador
Guatemala
Honduras (including Bahia and Swan Islands)
Nicaragua
Panama
Bermuda and Caribbean Area:
Bahamas
Barbados
Bermuda
Dominican Republic
French West Indies
Haiti (including Gonave and Tortuga Islands)
Jamaica
Leeward and Windward Islands
Netherlands Antilles
Trinidad and Tobago
1 45 d § 770, Supp. 1 (1993). "Canada is not included in any country
group and [is] referred to by name throughout the Export Administration
Regulations." Id.
1994]
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APPENDIX I (CONTINUED): COUNTRY GROUPS
South America
Northern Area:
Colombia
French Guiana (including Inini)
Guyana
Surinam
Venezuela
Western Area:
Bolivia
Chile
Ecuador (including the Galapagos Islands)
Peru
Eastern Area:
Argentina
Brazil
Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas)
Paraguay
Uruguay
Country Group V
All countries not included in any other country group
(except Canada).
Country Group W
Czechoslovakia
Poland
Country Group Y
Albania
Bulgaria
Cambodia
Estonia
Laos
Latvia
Lithuania
Mongolian People's Republic
The geographic area formerly known as the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics
[Vol. 15:4
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol15/iss4/4
1994] CLINTON'S EXPORT PROMOTION PLAN 705
APPENDIX I (CONTINUED): COUNTRY GROUPS
Country Group Z
North Korea
Vietnam
Cuba
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APPENDIX II: PERFORMANCE OF SELECTED COMPUTERS
146
COMPUTER Mtops
IBM Compatible Personal Computer ("PC")
(w/386-33 MHz Chip) 4
PC (w/486-33 MHz Chip) 12.4
Apple Macintosh (Quadra 700) 12.5
Apple Macintosh (Quadra 950) 17
PC (w/486-66 MHz Chip) 25
PC (w/Pentium Chip) 67
Sun Workstation (Model 402) 97
IBM Workstation (RISC/6000 model 580) 120
Hewlett Packard Workstation (9000 model 755) 190
IBM Workstation (RISC/6000 model 990) 256
Convex Mainframe (Model C3440) 310
DEC 4000 Departmental Computer 374
Sun Server 1000 (8 SuperSPARC processors) 446
Sun Server 2000 (20 CPUs) 877
DEC Server (10000-660 Alpha) 1302
IBM Mainframe ES/9000 (Model 820) 1769
146 This Appendix is an abbreviated version of a similar table found in
TPCC Plan, supra note 6, at 1658.
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